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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
Division,4 directed that if at a hearing before the county court, the defendant
proves the allegations, the judgment of conviction must be vacated and the
sentence must be imposed on the verdict. Thus the time to appeal would
commence anew.
The writ of coram nobis is usually held to matters occurring during the
trial; however, the Court of Appeals has not hesitated to expand the scope of
the writ to cases where no other judicial relief is available. 5 The right to a
criminal appeal is not a necessary part of constitutionally-guaranteed due
process,0 but if the defendant has been prevented from complying with the
statutory requirements for the taking and perfecting an appeal because of action
by law enforcement or prison authorities, he has been denied a right guaranteed
by the equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution7 and the New York
Constitution,8 and some method of judicial review must be afforded himY
In People v. Githr,'0 a case with facts analogous to the present, the
Appellate Division declined to state whether coram nobis or habeas corpus was
the correct remedy in such a case. The court, in an effort to avoid distinguishing
between the remedies, placed the burden of affording adequate relief on the
district attorney and the trial court at a subsequent hearing. The Court of
Appeals in the present case made no attempt to distinguish between coram
nobis and habeas corpus, as the Court was more interested in affording adequate
relief to a defendant whose constitutional rights had been impaired.
From these four cases, it can be seen that specific boundaries beyond which
the writ of coram nobis will not lie have been drawn. The Court of Appeals,
however, will not hesitate to readjust these boundaries within reason. The
Court will, in reality, examine the particular fact situation and manipulate
the boundaries in order to achieve substantial justice.
Bd.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS
MoRE REMOTE DESCENDANTS EXCLUDED FROM A DISPOSITION TO "My GRAND-
CHILDREN THEN LIVING"
In the case of In re Welles Will,' decided by the Court of Appeals in 1961,
the Court held that a trust for the testator's daughter for life with remainder
4. 12 A.D.2d 721, 208 N.Y.S.2d 138 (4th Dep't 1960).
5. People v. Sullivan, 3 N.Y.2d 196, 165 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1957); People v. Kronick, 308
N.Y. 866, 126 N.E.2d 307 (1955); People v. Hill, 9 A.D.2d 451, 195 N.Y.S.2d 295 (2d
Dep't 1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 935, 204 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1960).
6. People v. Gersewitz, 294 N.Y. 163, 61 N.E.2d 427 (1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
687 (1945).
7. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 11.
8. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 11.
9. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951). See also Cochran v.
State of Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942).
10. 5 A.D.2d 688, 169 N.Y.S.2d 256 (2d Dep't 1957).
1. 9 N.Y.2d 277, 213 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1961).
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to "my grandchildren then living" if she dies without issue, creates an interest
in those grandchildren who survive the life tenant only, and excludes the
descendants of those grandchildren who predeceased the life tenant. The
Court of Appeals, therefore, upheld decisions to the same effect in the Appellate
Division 2 and the Surrogate's Court:
The will creating the trust was executed in 1892 and a codicil thereto was
executed in 1898. On both occasions the testator had four children and five
grandctiildren. His son Benjamin had two children and one of his daughters,
Helen, had three children.
The will as modified by the codicil:
(a) made provision for Benjamin and his descendants;
(b) created a trust for Catharine (a daughter) for her life with re-
mainder to "my other children, Helen, Benjamin and Harriet" and if
any child should die before Catharine, his or her share "to be equally
divided among the descendants of the one so dying";
(c) created a trust for Helen and Harriet (both daughters) of 2 of
the residuary each. Helen and Harriet were to receive the income
therefrom for their lives and at their death the principal was to be
divided equally among the children of each daughter. It was also
provided that if Benjamin, Helen or Harriet should die without issue
surviving them, the amount held in trust for the one dying without
issue surviving was to be divided equally among "my grandchildren
then living." (Emphasis added.) At the end of the same clause the
testator provided: "It being my express wish that my property shall
be enjoyed by those of my own blood."
The testator had a total of five grandchildren but before the termination
of Harriet's life estate two grandchildren had died. Harriet was unmarried at
the time of the execution of the will and died when over 100 years of age,
unmarried and without issue. Testator's descendants at Harriet's death were
three grandchildren, seven great-grandchildren, and seventeen great-great-grand-
children. A special guardian was appointed for fifteen great-great-grandchildren
who were minors.
When Harriet died without issue the trustees began a construction proceed-
ing to determine who was to receive the remainder of Harriet's share. Although
the phrase "my grandchildren then living" seems quite clear, many problems
are raised in light of other provisions in the will.
The provisions for disposition of the children's shares at their death differ.
Benjamin's share was to pass to his descendants. No provision was made for
Catharine's offspring but rather her share was to pass to Helen, Benjamin and
Harriet or their descendants. Helen's and Harriet's share was to go to the
children of each. If Helen, Benjamin or Harriet died without issue then that
one's share was to pass "to my grandchildren then living."
2. 11 A.D.2d 780, 205 N.Y.S.2d 300 (2d Dep't 1960).
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The terms descendants and issue generally are interchangeable. 3 Although
descendant is often used to mean successive children, its legal meaning is issue
of a deceased person and does not include the child of a parent who is still
living.4 Thus, these two terms indicate that the testator contemplates children
of deceased children sharing with those of their parents' level. The children
take by representation.
The term children does not by itself evidence such an intent.5 However,
the testator here provided for Helen's and Harriet's children but made the
limitation over to grandchildren dependent upon the daughter dying without
issue. Therefore, the testator might have used children and issue to mean the
same thing. Thus, the descendants of deceased grandchildren raised the ques-
tion whether grandchildren was also assumed by the testator to mean descend-
ants or issue.
Even if this was not so, it was contended that the will of the testator as
a whole evidenced an intent to benefit all branches of his family equally. The
provision in the will that blood relatives were of primary concern was specific-
ally pointed to. This general intent, it was argued, overrides the limitation to
"grandchildren then living" which, because Harriet lived over 100 years, cut
off two lines of grandchildren.
Section 29 of the New York Decedent Estate Law provides that an estate
devised or bequeathed to a child or other descendant, or to a brother or sister
shall not lapse if such legatee or devisee dies in the lifetime of the testator, but
shall vest in the child or other descendant of such legatee or devisee. This
section does not apply in the instant case because (1) this is a class gift 6 and
(2) the grandchildren did not die in the lifetime of the testator. The descend-
ants were thus forced to rely on the intent of the testator without the aid of
this statutory presumption.
7
There is a considerable body of case law which has interpreted a limitation
to children to include more remote descendants whenever the "reason of the
thing demands it."8 There are fewer cases interpreting the word grandchildren
3. In re Radt's Will, 6 Misc. 2d 716, 167 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Surr. Ct. 1957).
4. In re Plaster's Estate, 179 Misc. 80, 37 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Surr. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 266
App. Div. 439, 43 N.Y.S.2d 1 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 822, 59 N.E.2d 181.
5. A gift to children, descendants, etc., is a gift to a class, In re Rumph's Will, 205
Misc. 404, 129 N.Y.S.2d 730 (Surr. Ct. 1954), and where there is an intervening estate with
a direction to divide and pay over to a class as remaindermen, if none of the exceptions
to the divide and pay over rule apply and no contrary intent is found, the members of
that class are to be determined at the time the remainder becomes possessory. The gift
is contingent until that time. Therefore, if a child dies before that time, his share is lost
even though survivorship is not expressly made a condition. Dickerson v. Sheehy, 209
N.Y. 592, 103 N.E. 717 (1913); In re Pulis, 220 N.Y. 196, 115 N.E. 516 (1917). Arguably,
then, for the purposes of this note we may consider the term grandchildren apart from the
limitation to those of that class then living since the divide and pay over rule would imply
such a condition even if the limitation were merely to my grandchildren.
6. In re Stebbins-Vallois' Estate, 99 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
7. This provision evidences a legislative concern for branches of descendants losing
their interests by lapse. Arguably, this policy should be considered even though the case is
not one covered by the narrow wording of the statute.
8. Prowitt v. Rodman, 37 N.Y. 42 (1867) is commonly cited as authority.
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so broadly, but it was here argued that the cases involving the interpretation
of a limitation to children applied to this case by analogy.9
Where there is a clear limitation to a specific class such as children, the
courts often require an unmistakeable intent to the contrary to be shown
before they will extend such a limitation to include more remote descendants.' 0
However, where some ambiguity is found in the limitation to that class, i.e., to
my children then living, together with those who may have died leaving a
child or children, their lawful issue, the courts are likely to hold that an inter-
pretation which favors more remote descendants is preferred." This is because
of a presumption against disinheritance.12 If the court is not willing to go
quite that far, it is often reasoned that the intent as it appears in the whole
will must be given effect.1 3 The above generalizations are not strictly adhered
to by the courts.
The burden of showing an unmistakeable intent to include within the
limitation to children more remote descendants is much lighter when all of the
children (using the term in its primary sense) have died. This is especially
true where the alternative to opening the class, children, to more remote de-
scendants is either intestacy or giving the estate to collaterals on a limitation
over. In In re Villalonga's Will,1 4 where the remainder after a life estate was
to any children of the life tenants surviving them but if no children survive
then to the children of the testator's nephew, the court held that the child of
a deceased daughter of the life tenant could not share in the estate with a
surviving daughter. The court distinguished Prowitt v. Rodman, 5 where all of
the children were deceased and the question was whether the limitation to chil-
dren included more remote descendants or whether the donee over would take.
In re Villalonga's Will was cited by the majority in the instant case as
authority for their holding that the issue of deceased grandchildren could not
share with then living grandchildren.' 6 The majority distinguished Prowitt v.
Rodman, as was done in the Villalonga case, and then went on to state that
if all grandchildren, as used in its primary sense, were dead, it would be easy
9. Restatement, Property § 291, recognizes this analogy. The argument may even
be stronger for the term grandchildren including more remote descendants since a testator
may refer to children as those for whom he is legally responsible. This possibility is not
usually present when the limitation is to grandchildren.
10. In re Villalonga's Will, 6 N.Y.2d 477, 190 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1959); In re Schaufele's
Will, 252 N.Y. 65, 168 N.E. 831 (1929); In re Loghry's Will, 113 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Surr. Ct.
1952).
11. In re Weil's Will, 151 Misc. 841, 843, 272 N.Y. Supp. 477, 480 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
In that case it was also said that where two interpretations are possible that which under
any contingency would avoid intestacy is to be preferred. See also In re Brown, 93 N.Y. 295
(1883); Matter of Patton, 111 N.Y. 480, 18 N.E. 625 (1888).
12. See Scott v. Guernsey, 48 N.Y. 106 (1871) ; Matter of Patton, supra note 11.
13. In re Buechner, 226 N.Y. 440, 123 N.E. 741 (1919).
14. Supra note 10.
15. Supra note 8.
16. In re Loghry's Will, supra note 12, held that a limitation to "my then surviving
grand-children, share and share alike" only gave an interest to grandchildren, rejecting a
contention that the testator did not intend to disinherit a complete line of grandchildren.
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to find that grandchildren included more remote descendants. The Court rea-
soned that where the language is clear and unambiguous there must be a
clear showing of unmistakeable intent to the contrary to raise a construction
problem.
The three dissenting judges stated that the intent as found in the whole
will was controlling and that there did appear an overall stirpital intent which
was contrary to the limitation over to "my grandchildren then living." The
dissent, accordingly, would have allowed the descendants of the deceased
grandchildren to share with the grandchildren who survived the life tenant.
P. D.C.
TRUST DISPOSITION, NOT AMBIGUOUS, NOT CONSTRUED TO INCLUDE AFTER-
ADOPTED CIIILDREN
In In re Ricks' Trust,"y the Court of Appeals construed a provision of
Section 115 of the Domestic Relations Law as restricting the over-all purpose
of the section; that of enlarging on the rights of adopted children.
The action was for construction of a trust agreement. The agreement
provided for the income from the trust to go to James Ricks during his life,
then to his descendants during a secondary measuring life, and the remainder
to his descendants. At the time the trust was created in 1950 James Ricks had
only natural born children. Subsequently he adopted children, thus giving
rise to the question of whether the adopted children are entitled to share in
the trust income during the secondary measuring life along with the natural
born children.
The Appellate Division held that they were not so entitled.' 8 In general,
a limitation in favor of "issue" or "descendants" will be construed to include
only persons who have a blood relationship to the ancestor. 10 Only when the
instrument itself, or certain extraneous facts show contrary intent, will the
words be held to include adopted children. In this case the word "descendants"
is used in the same manner in other clauses of the agreement, and this, along
with provisions for distribution per stirpes, reflects concern only with regard
to the blood lines. The Appellate Division noted that
It has been consistently held in similar circumstances, .where a
child has been adopted after the death of the testator, that the adopted
child does not fall within the class of persons designated as "issue" or
"descendants" in the will.
20
The Appellate Division also distinguished the present case from In re
17. 10 N.Y.2d 231, 219 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1961).
18. 12 A.D.2d 395, 212 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1st Dep't 1961).
19. 3 Powell, Real Property 132 (1952); New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Vicle,
161 N.Y. 11, 55 N.E. 311 (1899).
20. Supra note 18 at 397, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 548. See In re Peabody's Will, 17 Misc. 2d
656, 185 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Surr. Ct. 1959); In re Cook's Will, 8 Misc. 2d 103, 165 N.Y.S.2d
806 (Surr. Ct. 1957) ; In re Hilt's Estate, 5 Misc. 2d 862, 160 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Surr. Ct. 1957),
aff'd, 4 A.D.2d 1013, 168 N.Y.S.2d 925 (ist Dep't 1957).
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